- PII
- S1811-833X0000617-8-1
- DOI
- 10.7868/SX0000617-8-1
- Publication type
- Article
- Status
- Published
- Authors
- Abstract
- The most important difference between contemporary compatibilist and libertarian theories is not the difference in their positions regarding the truth of the thesis of physical determinism, but their different approaches to the causal role of agents. According to libertarians, volitional acts performed by agents constitute a specific type of causes, which are not themselves caused by other causes. In this respect, event-causal libertarianism is similar to the agent-causal libertarianism, because it insists that in performing a volitional act an agent can choose one of the alternative outcomes without being caused to do so by anything else, where‘anything else’ includes all the facts about the past and the present. Since event-causal libertarians maintain that volitional acts and the causal role of agents can be explained naturalistically, they must solve the problem of luck, i.e., they must explain how an agent is able to control her choices, given that she can choose one way or another without there being any difference in her state immediately preceding the moment of choice. This problem arises not from the indeterminism per se, but from the way it is coupled with the causal role of agents. In section one, I consider the historical development of compatibilist views on physical determinism and indeterminism. In section two, I present an overview of conditional analyses of alternative possibilities. In section three, I analyze the reasons why libertarians reject any type of conditional analysis, and show that intuitive objections against physical determinism, which portrait it as an obstacle to freedom, are untenable. In section four, I consider the consequence argument and show how it is related to the libertarian condition of sourcehood. In the final section, I analyze the problem of luck and show that it inevitably arises for any version of libertarianism. I demonstrate that indeterminism is a problem for libertarians, although they need it. And it is not a problem for compatibilists, who, while they do not need it, can incorporate it in their theories without facing the problem of luck.
- Keywords
- compatibilism, libertarianism, physical determinism, physical indeterminism, volition, the problem of luck
- Date of publication
- 01.12.2020
- Year of publication
- 2020
- Number of purchasers
- 11
- Views
- 557
RAS PresidiumОбщественные науки и современность Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost
- ISSN (Print) 0869-0499
- ISSN (Online) 2712-9101
Libertarian Volition and the Problem of Luck
Индексирование
Scopus
Crossref
Higher Attestation Commission
At the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation
Scientific Electronic Library