Везде
Qualia irreducibility thesis: rational argument or unreasonable presupposition
Table of contents
Annotation Estimate Publication content
References Comments
Share
QR
Metrics
Qualia irreducibility thesis: rational argument or unreasonable presupposition
Annotation
PII
S1811-833X0000617-8-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Mikhail S. Sopov 
Edition
Volume 57 Issue 4
Pages
158-170
Abstract
The article discusses the possibility of a naturalistic explanation of phenomenal experience (qualia). It starts with the analysis of one of the thought experiments described by D. Chalmers in his book “The Conscious Mind. In search of a fundamental theory”, namely, a zombie experiment. The article shows that the conclusions of this experiment can be recognized as correct only provided that the experimenter imagines a complete functional analogue of a human being. However, this condition is not feasible, since the experimenter is required to possess the totality of knowledge about the imaginary creature. Experimenter’s imagination is in one way or another determined by the available conceptual schemes. It is concluded that the thesis of the irreducibility of qualia, based on the data of thought experiments, is a presupposition of conscious mind studies, and not their conclusion. From my point of view, this presupposition can be challenged just as N.I. Lobachevsky challenged the intuitive plausibility of Euclid’s fifth axiom. As an alternative understanding of the nature of qualia I propose J. McDowell's approach, which is called “perceptual conceptualism”.
Keywords
phenomenal experience, qualia, philosophical zombie, David Chalmers, perceptual conceptualism, John McDowell
Date of publication
01.12.2020
Number of purchasers
11
Views
424
Readers community rating
0.0 (0 votes)
Cite Download pdf

References



Additional sources and materials

    

  1. Brewer, B. “Perceptual Experience Has Conceptual Content”, in: M. Steup, E. Sosa (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden: Blackwell, 2005, 364 pp.
    2. 

  2. Byrne, A. “Experience and Content”, Philosophical Quarterly, 2009, vol. 59, pp. 429‒451.
    3. 

  3. Chalmers, D.J. The Conscious Mind. Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, 414 pp.
    4. 

  4. Chalmers, D.J. “The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism”, in:
    5. 

  5. Chalmers, D. The Character of Consciousness. New York: OUP, 2010, pp. 141‒192.
    6. 

  6. Chalmers, D.J. “Intuitions in Philosophy: a Minimal Defense”, Philosophical Studies, 2014, vol. 171, no. 3, pp. 535‒544.
    7. 

  7. Dennett, D.C. Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 2005, 199 pp.
    8. 

  8. Garntseva, N.M. “Sovremennye nereduktivnye podhody k psihofizicheskoj probleme (McGinn, Nagel, Chalmers)” [Modern Nonreductive Approaches to the MindBody Problem (McGinn, Nagel, Chalmers)], Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences, 2012, no. 11, pp. 129‒139. (In Russian)
    9. 

  9. Hill, C.S. “Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind-Body Problem”, Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 1997, vol. 87, no. 1, pp. 61‒85.
    10. 

  10. Ivanov, D.V. Priroda fenomenal’nogo soznaniya [The Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness]. Moscow: URSS, 2013, 240 pp. (In Russian)
    11. 

  11. Jackson, F. “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly, 1982, vol. 32, pp. 127‒136.
    12. 

  12. Karpenko, A.S. “Sverkhrealizm. Chast’ I: ot myslimogo k vozmozhnomu” [Hyperrealism, Part 1: From the Thinkable To the Possible], Filosofskii zhurnal – Journal of Philosophy, 2016, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 5‒23. (In Russian)
    13. 

  13. Kirk, R. Zombies and Consciousness. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005, 235 pp.
    14. 

  14. Kripke, S.A. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980, 184 pp.
    15. 

  15. Levine, J. “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1983, vol. 64, pp. 354‒361.
    16. 

  16. McDowell, J. Mind and World. Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press, 1994, 191 pp.
    17. 

  17. McGinn, C. The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World. New York: Basic Books, 1999, 242 pp.
    18. 

  18. Nagumanova, S.F. Materializm i soznanie: analiz diskussii o prirode soznaniya v sovremennoj analiticheskoj filosofii [Materialism and Consciousness: An Analysis of the Debate on the Nature of Consciousness in Contemporary Analytical Philosophy]. Kazan: Kazan University, 2011, 221 pp. (In Russian)
    19. 

  19. Peacocke, C. “Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?”, Journal of Philosophy, 2001, vol. 98, pp. 239‒264.
    20. 

  20. Popper, К. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 2002, 513 pp.
    21. 

  21. Sekatskaya, M.A. “Issledovanie soznaniya v filosofii i kognitivnyh naukah: pochemu trudnaya problema soznaniya ne nuzhdaetsya v reshenii” [Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Why the Hard Problem Doesn’t Need a Solution], Voprosy filosofii, 2015, no. 4, pp. 185‒194. (In Russian)
    22. 

  22. Sekatskaya, M.A. “Pochemu razryv v ob”yasnenii ne yavlyaetsya reshayushchim argumentom protiv naturalizma v filosofii soznaniya” [Why the Explanatory Gap is not a Decisive Argument Against Naturalism in Philosophy of Mind], Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2015, no. 2, pp. 125‒135. (In Russian)
    23. 

  23. Stoljar, D. Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006, 249 pp.
    24. 

  24. Szabó Gendler, T., Hawthorne, J. (eds.). Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, 518 pp.
    25. 

  25. Tye, M. “Non-conceptual Content, Richness, and Fineness of Grain”, in: Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J. (eds.) Perceptual Experience. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005, 560 pp.
    26. 

  26. Vasilyev, V.V. Trudnaya problema soznaniya [The Hard Problem of Consciousness]. Moscow: Prgress-Tradiciya, 2009, 272 pp. (In Russian)
    27.

Comments

No posts found

Write a review
Translate