Библиография

Дополнительные библиографические источники и материалы

Балацкий Е. В. Непроизводственные издержки в теории институциональных ловушек // Актуальные проблемы государственного строительства и управления. М., 2000.
Балацкий Е. В. Функциональные свойства институциональных ловушек // Экономика и математические методы. 2002. Т. 38. N 3.
Барсукова С. Б. Теневая экономика и теневая политика: механизм сращивания (препринт ВШЭ, WP4/2006/01). 2006.
Гуссейнов Р. М. Закон периферийного прогресса: гипотеза // Историко-экономические исследования. 2004. Т. 4. N 1.
Истоки. Из опыта изучения экономики как структуры и процесса. М., 2006.
Латов Ю. В. Теория зависимости от предшествующего развития в контексте институциональной истории // Экономический вестник Ростовского государственного университета. 2005. Т. 3. N 3.
Либман А. М. "Вторая трансформация" в постсоветских странах // Общественные науки и современность. 2007. N 3.
Полтерович В. М. Институциональные ловушки и экономические реформы // Экономика и математические методы. 1999. Т. 35. N 2.
Полтерович В. М. Институциональные ловушки: есть ли выход? // Общественные науки и современность. 2004. N 3.
Acemoglu D., Robinson J., Verdier T. Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule // Journal of the European Economic Association. 2004. Vol. 2. N 2 - 3.
Acemoglu D., Ticchi D., Vindigni A. Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient States. Mimeo, 2007.
Acemoglu D., Verdier T. The Choice Between Market Failure and Corruption // American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. N 1.
Amable B. The Diversity of Modern Capitalism. Oxford, 2004.
Aslund A., Boone P., Johnson S. Escaping the Under-Reform Trap // IMF Staff Paper. 2001. Vol. 48.
Beckmann K., Gerrits C. Making Sense of Corruption: Hobbesian Jungle, Bribary as an Auction, and DUP Activities. Mimeo, 2007.
Beckmann M., Pies I. Ordnungsverantwortung - Konzeptionelle Ueberlegungen zugunsten einer semantischen Innovation. Mimeo, 2006.
Bednar J., Page S. E. Culture, Institutional Performance, and Path Dependence. Mimeo, 2006.
Boyer R. How and Why Capitalisms Differ // Economy and Society. 2005. Vol. 34. N 4.
Bueno de Mesquita B., Smith A., Silverson R. M., Morrow J. D. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, 2005.
Campos N. F., Karanasos M. G. Growth, Volatility, and Political Instability: Non-Linear Time-Series Evidence for Argentina, 1986 - 2000. IZA Discussion Paper. N 3087. 2007.
Chatterjee P., Shukayev M. Democracy and Growth Volatility: Exploring the Link. Mimeo, 2006.
Congleton R. D. From Royal to Parliamentary Rule without Revolution, the Economics of Constitutional Exchange within Divided Governments. Mimeo, 2007.
David P. Path Dependence, Its Critics and the Quest for "Historical Economics". Mimeo, 2000.
Deeg R. Complementarity and Institutional Change in Capitalist Systems // Journal of European Public Policy. 2007. Vol. 14. N 4.
Deeg R., Jackson G. Towards a More Dynamic Theory of Capitalist Variety // Socio-Economic Review. 2007. Vol. 5.
Dietl H. Institutionen und Zeit. Tübingen, 1993.
Do Q. T. Institutional Trap. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper N 3291. 2004.
Dreher A., Gassebner M. Greasing the Wheels of Entrepreneurship? Impact of Regulation and Corruption on Firm Entry? CESifo Working Paper N 2013. 2007.
Escosura L. P., Sanz-Villarroya I. de la. Institutional Instability and Growth in Argentina: A Long-Run View.
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Economic History and Institutions Working Paper Series N 67. 2004.
Fukuyama F. Development and the Limits of Institutional Design. Mimeo, 2006.
Fukuyama F. Social Capital and Civil Society. Mimeo, 1999.
Gächter S., Herrmann B. The Limits of Self-Governance when Cooperators Get Punished: Experimental Evidence from Urban and Rural Russia. CeDEx Discussion Paper N 11. 2007.
Gangoff S. The Political Economy of High Income Taxation: Capital Taxation, Path Dependence, and Political Institutions in Denmark // Comparative Political Studies. 2007. Vol. 40. N 9.
Gans H. J. Sociological Amnesia: The Noncumulation of Normal Social Science // Sociological Forum. 1992. Vol. 7. N4.
Gelbach S. Revenue Traps // Economics and Politics. 2007. Vol. 19. N 1.
Groenewegen J., Steen M. van der. The Evolutionary Policy Maker // Journal of Economic Issues. 2007. Vol. 41. N 2.
Harstad B., Svensson J. From Corruption to Lobbying and Economic Growth. Mimeo, 2006.
Heinemann F., Tanz B. The Impact of Trust on Reforms. Mimeo, 2007.
Henisz W. J. The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth // Economics and Politics. 2000. Vol. 12. N 1.
Henisz W. J. The Institutional Environment for Infrastructure Investments // Industrial and Corporate Change. 2002. Vol. 11. N 2.
Henisz W. J., Zelner B. A. Interest Groups, Veto Points, and Electricity Infrastructure Development // International Organization. 2006. Vol. 60.
Henisz W. J., Zelner B. A. The Institutional Environment for Telecommunication Investment // Journal of Economic and Management Strategy. 2001. Vol. 10. N 1.
Höpner M. What Connects Industrial Relations and Corporate Governance? Explaining Institutional Complementarity // Socio-Economic Review. 2005. Vol. 3.
Immergut E. Health Politics, Interests and Institutions in Western Europe. Cambridge, 1992.
Jackson G., Deeg R. How Many Varieties of Capitalism? MPIfG Discussion Paper N 2. 2006.
Karayalcin C. Divided We Stand, United We Fall: The Hume-Weber-Jones Mechanism for the Rise of Europe. Mimeo. 2004.
Knudsen Ch. The Essential Tension in the Social Sciences: Between the "Unification" and the "Fragmentation" Trap // Scandinavian Working Papers in Economics. N 6. 2002.
Liebowitz S. J., Margolis S. E. Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History // Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. 1995. Vol. 11. N 1.
McFaul M. Institutional Design, Uncertainty, and Path Dependence: Cases from Russia // Constitutional Political Economy. 1999. Vol. 10.
Mobarak A. M. Democracy, Volatility, and Economic Development // Review of Economics and Statistics. 2005. Vol. 87. N 2.
North D., Wallis J. J., Webb S. E., Weingast B. Limited Access Orders in the Developing World: A New Approach to the Problems of Development. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper N 4359. 2007.
North D., Wallis J. J., Weingast B. A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. NBER Working Paper 12795. 2006.
Page S. E. Path Dependence // Quarterly Journal of Political Science. 2006. Vol. 1.
Pierson P. Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics // American Political Science Review. 2000. Vol. 94. N 2.
Polterovich V. M. Institutional Trap. Mimeo, 2008.
Roland G. Understanding Institutional Change: Fast Moving and Slow Moving Institutions // Studies in Comparative International Development. 2004. Vol. 38. N 4.
Sheng L. When Will a Dictator Be Good? // Economic Theory. 2007. Vol. 31.
Streek W., Thielen K. Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies // Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies. Oxford, 2005.
Tackett T. When the King Took Flight. Cambridge, 2004.
Torgler B., Schneider F. Shadow Economy, Tax Morale, Governance and Institutional Quality: A Panel Analysis. IZA Discussion Paper N 2563. 2007.
Tooley J., Dixon P. Private Schools for the Poor: A Case Study from India. CfBT Working Paper. 2003.
Tsebelis G. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, 2002.
Zanden J. L. van. Economic Growth in a Period of Political Fragmentation: Western Europe 900 - 1300. Mimeo, 2007.
Vaubel R. A History of Thought on Institutional Competition. Mimeo, 2007.
Vitols S. Das "deutsche Modell" in der politischen Oekonomie. Mimeo, 2006.
Volckart O. Die Ursachen der deutschen Kleinstaaterei // Oekonomische und politische Grenzen von Wirtschaftsräumen. Berlin, 2006.
Weede E. Political Regime Type and Variation in Economic Growth Rates // Constitutional Political Economy. 1996. Vol. 7.